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of expenditures in excess of reported income tends to establish one element
of the crime, but in this case does not logically fortify the truth of the admission); evidence which tends to fortify the truth of the admission, but
which need not touch any element of the corpus delicti (evidence of large
expenditures during the prosecution period also fails logically to fortify the
truth of the defendant's admission that he had no prior accumulated funds).
Evidence insufficient to establish the whole of the corpus delicti cannot be
used to corroborate an admission of one element of the corpus delicti when
that evidence does not fortify the truth of the admission. 'Of course, this
objection to the adequacy of corroboration can be made only if elements of
the method of proof are treated as elements of the corpus delicti.
In holding that the requirement of corroboration extends to extrajudicial
admissions, the Court was probably motivated by a desire to preserve the
effectiveness of the net-worth method for proving tax evasion. Corroboration
is a firmly rooted and psychologically appealing requirement in the criminal
law, and perhaps the Court cannot be criticized for straining to find that the
corpus delicti was sufficiently established by independent evidence of an
equivocal sort. It might be wished that the Court had seen fit to wipe the
slate clean by abolishing the requirement of corroboration, for it seems there
would be few cases in which the prosecution could not meet the requirement
of corroboration by the standards the Court accepts. Instead it will remain
a superfluous technicality which will furnish grounds for allegations of error.
What the Court gives with one hand, it seems to take away with the other.

SOLVING AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DISPUTE
THE ATTITUDE OF THE NLRB AND
REVIEWING COURTS
On March 26, 1952, Eleanor Steib, a member of the Communication Workers of America, CIO, sent a letter of resignation to her union and notified her
employer, the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, to cancel her union dues
deduction authorization. These actions were taken by Miss Steib while a
collective bargaining agreement containing a "maintenance of membership"
clause was in effect.1 The agreement was to expire on April 5, 1952. Although
Miss Steib did not pay her dues for any part of April, the union did not insist
upon her discharge until October 7, 1952, explaining that the delay was ne-

IA maintenance of membership clause requires that employees who are members of a
union at the beginning of a collective bargaining agreement or those who join during the
life of the agreement must remain members until the expiration of the agreement. The
provision affords less union security than a union shop clause by which an employee must
join the union sometime after his employment. The usual maintenance of membership
clause provides an escape period at the end or beginning of an agreement during which
an employee may withdraw his membership without forfeiting his job.
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cessitated by a "grace period" in its constitution.2 By October, however, a new
agreement was in force which contained a maintenance of membership provision substantially similar to the one contained in the prior agreement. 3 The
second agreement had been signed on April 14, 1952, leaving a nine-day interim between agreements.
In compliance with the union demand the company discharged Miss Steib.
Subsequently she complained to the National Labor Relations Board that her
discharge constituted an unfair labor practice. 4 The Board issued a ceaseand-desist order requiring reinstatement, 5 and a divided court enforced the
order. 6 Despite the union contention that membership was terminated only
by expulsion, promotion, or transfer, the court believed Miss Steib had effectively resigned and that because of the "grace period" she could not have
been discharged before the expiration of the older agreement. The court also
stated that because of the interim period, Miss Steib was not a member of the
union during the new agreement and therefore not subject to its union security clause. Thus the court found the union by "the peculiar facts of this
case... in a dilemma" from which "we cannot extricate it, without adding
7
to the only agreement emerging from the bargaining table."1
The case involves an unusual fact situation, but it indicates the present
attitude taken by the Board and the reviewing courts in solving industrial
relations problems. This comment will examine the consequences of such an
approach and will suggest other possible approaches.
It was clear to the court that Miss Steib's resignation was not forbidden by
the union constitution. The union, however, had argued that it alone should
prescribe and interpret its rules and that its interpretation did not permit
2

"'Article VI-DUES, FINES AND ASSESSMENTS. Section S-Non-Payment of Dues,
Fines and Assessments. A member in default, without good cause, in the payment of any
installment of dues or any fine or assessment for sixty (60) days from the date such
amount becomes due, shall be automatically suspended from the rights of membership
and, if the default continues without good cause for an additional thirty (30) days, after
notice in writing by the Local Secretary, shall be automatically expelled from the Union.
'Good Cause' shall be that which the governing body of the Local determines to be good
cause."
""Article XI-MAINTENANCE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP. Section 1. Employees
who are members of the Union as of the effective date of this agreement shall, as a condition of employment, maintain membership in the Union until termination of this agreement or until promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit.
"Section 2. Employees who are members of the Union on or after the 30th day following the beginning of their employment or the effective date of this agreement, whichever is the later, shall, as a condition of continued employment, maintain membership in
the Union until the termination of this agreement or until promoted or transferred out
of the bargaining unit."
'The specific allegations of the complaint are in Communication Workers of America,
CIO v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 835, 837 (CA. 2d, 1954).
'New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1993).
C 215 F. 2d 835 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
SIbid., at 839-40.
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resignations. In a footnote to its opinion, the court remarks, "It is interesting
to note that the Union itself recognized a right to resign. In a letter to Miss
Steib, the Union stated the following: 'Resignations can only be accepted
when they comply with the terms of our past and present contract or are
tendered when no contract exists.' ",8 But rather than declaring that this letter
demonstrated that the union did in fact permit resignations, the court apparently accepts the union's later contention and proceeds unnecessarily to discuss the review to be given union rules. Thus the entire question of the extent
of regulation of the internal affairs of unions was considered.
Much writing has been directed toward defining the extent to which a union
shall remain autonomous in its disciplinary actions.9 In the federal area, Section 8(b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act'0 limits the right of a
union to ask for discharges to severances due to failure of a member in meeting his financial obligations of dues or initiation fees. The limitations were
the result of much concern over rather arbitrary dismissals for "disloyalty,"
"dissension" or "dishonorable conduct."" It is submitted, however, that the
freedom of unions to regulate their internal affairs, like other freedoms, is not
to be unnecessarily invaded. 12 An example of the dangers of intrusion is revealed in a statement by the union counsel after the court's decision:
S Ibid., at 837.

'E.g., Forkosch, Internal Affairs of Unions: Government Control or Self-Regulation?,
18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 729 (1951); Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Indust. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 483 (1950); The Power of Trade Unions To Discipline Their Members,
96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 537 (1948); Procedural "Due Process" in Union Disciplinary Proceedings, 57 Yale L. J. 1302 (1948).
0061 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (2) (Supp., 1950).
' In a way, the democracy of the typical union constitution is the democracy of the
Soviet constitution of 1936. Both provide for a rigorous solidarity in the face of "capitalistic encirclement." And both are applied in the double-edged atmosphere of a one-party
situation-the International Typographical Union is one of the rare two-party unions in
this country. The analogy is not peculiar to unions, however-e.g., the "crime" of "uncommercial conduct" in the commodities exchange field. What seems peculiar to unions
is the extent of government regulation of their affairs, while at the same time, little attempt at a contract interpretation peculiar to the needs of the industrial community is
made by the enforcing courts.
For those who like their problems placed in the "larger setting," it is suggested that
the issues to be discussed are part of the problem of the freedom to be given voluntary
associations. John Stuart Mill, in his essay On Liberty, regarded as the essential liberties,
liberty of conscience, liberty of tastes and pursuits, and liberty of combination among
individuals. Little attention was directed to the latter by Mill-but now the problem of
association is the typical and thereby important problem of modern liberty: "The central issue in labor law today is probably whether there is not too much of it-partly in
terms of how much law is necessary to achieve certain ends, but partly, too, in terms of
whether democratic law works at all when it crosses certain lines drawn sometimes by
individuals in their demand for freedom and sometimes by private groups in their exertion of a power not fundamentally different from that of government." Wirtz, The New
National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer Persuasion," 49 Nw. U. L. Rev.
594, 618 (1954).
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It may also be noted that the result of the majority's decision is to cause unions
to refuse to grant any "grace periods" to any members who may be in default
in the payment of dues. This undoubtedly will work hardships upon individual
members and will also be used to cause opposition to the "harshness" of labor
unions in demanding immediate payment of dues.' 3
It is submitted that the court should have resolved the resignation issue by
the union's own admission of the right to resign.14 To deserve autonomy, unions should draft their constitutions, by-laws, and rules clearly so as to erase
all suspicion of arbitrariness.' 5 In this case such drafting was not evidenced;
but the court does not confine its opinion to such matters. It declares that the
"proviso [to 8 (b) (1) (A) ] only states that the union shall be free to prescribe its own rules with respect to membership, it does not prohibit the Board
and the courts from interpreting those rules"' 6 -relying upon a case not in
point.' 7 This seems unnecessary dictum dangerous to the autonomy of any
union.
A constant motive in the majority opinion is the fear of reading too much
into the collective bargaining agreement, of adding to what was obtained at
the bargaining table. One might expect that the court would look to the intent
of the parties to determine what was to govern during the interstitial period.
But the majority merely observes that "the parties were without any agreement."' s The dissent, however, takes issue:
In the setting of the labor relations at this plant, the factor of the technically
new contract, even with the few days' intervening interval, was not of realistic
" Lab. Rel. Rep., 34 Analysis 92. A more surprising actual result is also revealed by
Mayer: "Anybody who belongs to a union which has a union-maintenance clause could,
by using the court-approved gimmick of resignation, block the union from thereafter insisting upon discharge for failure to pay dues. The New Jersey Bell Telephone Company
has already taken the position that despite a union-maintenance clause, it will not discharge employees who fail to pay dues if those employees had already resigned from the
union." Daily Labor Reporter, No. 189: A-2. This position is hardly tenable; it is clear
from the court's opinion that after the time allowed by the "grace period" has expired,
the union may insist upon a discharge if the same collective bargaining agreement is in
effect.
The court might also have reasoned that the union could have had Miss Steib discharged before April 5, since the "grace period" may be said to apply only to a "member
in default" (see note 2 supra). That is, upon resignation one is no longer a "member"-default or otherwise; the clause concerns delinquent members, not those who are no longer
members.
For a full list of suggestions as to what unions should do to preserve their autonomy
by placing themselves beyond reproach, consult Forkosch, Internal Affairs of Unions:
Government Control or Self-Regulation?, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 729, 744-45 (1951).
16215 F. 2d 835, 838 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
"NLRB v. National Seal Corp., 127 F. 2d 776 (C.A. 2d, 1942), where, unlike the Communication Workers case, the issue was not the review of union interpretation of union
rules but whether or not the company could successfully argue that a default in dues
because of a delinquency provision in the union constitution meant that those members
in default were no longer represented by the union.
-219 F. 2d 835, 836 (C.A. 2d, 1954).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

significance, since the parties intended to and 19did go on just as before, so far as
this aspect of their relationship is concerned.
That the contract was intended to operate until a new agreement was negotiated is emphasized by the fact that no strike occurred during the interim
despite the usual union position of "no contract, no work."
An example of a more "realistic" approach is the arbitrator's decision in
Monogram Productions,Inc.,2 0 where the arbitrator decided that "as a matter
of practice" the parties continued to observe most of the important provisions
2
of an expired agreement during a contract negotiation period. ' In any event,
instead of examining the behavior of the parties during the interstitial period
to determine their intent, the Communication Workers court is worried lest it
afford the union more security than it had obtained at the bargaining table by
in effect extending the old agreement. The worry seems perhaps unnecessary
since "[a] 1954 BNA survey of representative contracts showed that 82 per2
cent provided for automatic renewal" !--suggesting that a renewal provision
would meet with little opposition at the bargaining table.
To the union's argument that discharge was justified under the first agreement the court replies that "the company's obligation to discharge and Miss
Steib's liability to be discharged for non-maintenance of union membership
terminated with the 1950 agreement" so that after April 5, a discharge by the
company would be an unfair labor practice. The court explains that they are
not saying that "the remedy for a breach of contract may not survive the
contract."2 3 Thus, the question of whether or not a right to remedy accrued
before the termination of the first agreement is posed. Suppose a dispute arises
under a collective bargaining agreement as to an employee's wage rate under
a prior agreement which included grievance machinery-the issue being the
classification of the worker's job under the former agreement. This court
19Ibid., at 840. The reluctance to examine intent may arise from the court's apparent
hesitation to view Miss Steib as "in effect a party-a co-obligor-to the agreement," for
the proposition is accepted only "arguendo." That is to say, because of an unwillingness
to consider Miss Steib a "party" there is reluctance to extend any agreement to which she
may be a party. For the status of the individual employee to sue on a collective bargaining agreement, consult The Ability of an Individual Employee To Sue His Employer on a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 270 (1954). Consult also 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1430 (1954), noting Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F. 2d 623 (C.A. 3d, 1954), for criticism of a case deciding that a lalbor organization could not bring action for declaratory judgment of the salaries owed individual
employees because of an alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
2013 Lab. Arb. Reports 782 (1949).
2 The arbitrator also rejected a statute of frauds argument by which it was claimed
that the agreement to be valid must have been in writing: "contractual relationships in
the labor field and the commercial field differ markedly, and it is not valid to apply the
provisions of the Civil Code to the former field in any mechanical or automatic manner."
Ibid., at 784.
"Lab. ReI. Rep., L R X 94.
- 215 F. 2d 835, 839 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
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might argue by analogy to the present case that the employer's obligation to
submit the issue to the grievance machinery had terminated.
This result seems illogical. Reference to the tools of Hohfeldian analysis
suggests that the Communication Workers court should have reached a different conclusion, assuming, with the court, that Miss Steib had effectively
25
resigned.2 4 Because of the maintenance of membership clause, there was a
duty by Miss Steib to the union to maintain her membership and a correlative
right by the union to the benefit of her membership. Also, because of the
maintenance of membership clause, the union had a conditional right against
the company to cause Miss Steib's dismissal upon her failure to maintain her
membership (the company having a conditionalduty). As between Miss Steib
and the company there was a power by the latter to discharge and, of course,
a liability on the former. Therefore, when Miss Steib resigned, she failed in her
duty, giving the union an unconditionalright at that time to demand her discharge--the "grace period" provision 26 involving merely a passage of time,
not limiting the right.
Thus, the dissenting view of Judge Clark seems well founded: "But I do
think the Board holding, reiterated here, that termination of the contract
wipes out previous defaults is definitely erroneous and quite unfortunate as a
future precedent. ' 27 This view becomes more apparent upon realizing the in29
evitability of lags in any large concern. 28 In InternationalHarvester Co., the
arbitrator expressly rejected the "familiar rule of contract interpretation that
all obligations under a contract are discharged by the termination of the con309
tract unless the contract specifically provides otherwise." Here, during a
contract which had followed a short period without agreement, a worker established an average piece-work earning rate which by terms of a prior contract was to be retroactive. The Board has come close to the arbitrator's position in this case. In National Lead Company,-" discharge was permitted because of failure to pay dues under a prior agreement since the second contract
followed the first with no hiatus:
- Consult besides Hohfeld's own articles: Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29

Yale L. 1. 163 (1919); Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale L. J. 739

(1919).
See note 3 supra.
: See note 2 supra.

215 F. 2d 835, 841 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
An example of the recognition given delays in the business community is the latitude
provided carriers in complying with a seller's stop-delivery order by section 13 of the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act and by section 2-705(3) (a) of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Consult Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-201(27) for a wider scope of this
principle.
2

16 Lab. Arb. Reports 775 (191).
sIbid., at 778.
• 106 N.L.R.B. 545 (1953).
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To find that these employees are relieved from the payment of dues owing at
the conclusion of the first in a series of uninterrupted contract terms would, we
32
believe, place undue emphasis upon the form of the contractual arrangement.
It is difficult to see how the Communication Workers court distinguished this
case if its decision really rests on the idea that the obligation to discharge
terminated with the original agreement; for how could even an immediately
38
succeeding contract revive the obligation?
Again in Monsanto Chemical Co.,34 a board of arbitration rejected an employee's contention that he had resigned during an escape period, finding that
the new agreement had retroactive application:
[T]he "collective bargaining" agreement, while relatively new in our economy
and in our law, has many, if not most, of the characteristics of ordinary contracts;
and it is to the interests of Management, Labor and the Public that such agreements be given the stability that arises from applying to them many, and indeed
most, of the "rules" applicable to ordinary contracts. On the other hand, in the
"emerging jurisprudence of labor relations," it is equally important that the "rules"
be modified and adapted to the essential differences between "collective bargaining" agreements and other contracts. This modification and adaptation of the
"rules" to the essential nature of the particular transaction involved is not novel;
it is not "extra-legal"; it is, indeed, quite in keeping with what has been the development of what we glibly term the law of "ordinary" contracts. The law courts, in
most instances without the aid of express statutes, have adopted for contracts of
insurance, suretyship contracts, and many more, special rules that recognize the
particular social function of such contracts. So here.
It has been repeatedly recognized in the decisions of arbitrators, who in the main
are molding the "emerging jurisprudence of labor relations," and in some administrative and judicial decisions, that there is a "continuing contractual" relation between employer and union. True, this contractual relation contains terms which are
changed or modified through periodic, frequently annual, "negotiations"; and it is
true that the contract relation is periodically, frequently annually, re-stated in a
new document which bears new "terminal" dates. But it is also true that, in the
main, the basic terms of the contract between the parties remain the same from
year to year and that the periodic adjustments are concerned principally with direct
wage rates and with "fringe" wage rates resulting from paid vacations, additional
paid holidays, "call-in" pay, etc. Terms relating to "union recognition," the processing of grievances, arbitration, and the like, remain the same from year to year,
without even more than slight verbal change.35
This position was later rejected by the Board. 30
In the Communication Workers case the court pursued a policy of strict
Ibid., at 548.
Consider also the dilemma a union faces: it must either act at once and disclose its
weakness by discharging before an agreement expires and negotiations begin, or it must
waive action upon its delinquent members.
2412 Lab. Arb. Reports 1175 (1949).
Ibid., at 1182.
'Monsanto Chemical Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951). In Phelps Dodge Copper Products
Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 686 (1945), discharge was not permitted although all routine procedures leading to dismissal had been taken.
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contract construction to avoid "adding" to the collective bargaining agreement, the bargaining table and not the courts being the proper place for "addition." But less stringent approaches are possible. Such approaches often
result from a conception of "industrial jurisprudence":
Collective bargaining is primarily an institution of industrial self-government. Its
constitution is the National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act and similar basic statutes and court decisions. Its statutory law is written in collective agreements during the annual bargaining conferences between employers and the representatives of their employees. In the grievance
and arbitration procedure are found
3
its administrative and judicial tribunals.
And, therefore, "The determination of disputes arising during this process is
more a matter of creating new law than of construing the provisions of a
tightly drawn document." 8 The "industrial jurisprudence" position is overstated, however, if much emphasis is given "new law." The creation of "new
law" is not the proper function of a court presented with a dispute arising
from a collective bargaining agreement. Contracts are made for serious purposes, and the Board and courts must in this area respect a statute which has
many definite policy preferences. Thus, the real contribution of "industrial
jurisprudence" is not a "liberal" contract construction policy as opposed to a
"strict" contract construction policy, but rather an "intelligent" contract
construction policy.
The differences between the strict contract construction approach and the
"industrial jurisprudence" approach can be seen in several cases. In Idarado
Mining Co.,8 9 a member of the Mine Production Workers voluntarily left his
employment as an electrician. A year later, within the same agreement, he was
hired as watchman by the same employer. The Board decided that continuation in the union was unnecessary since the maintenance of membership clause
had not expressly provided for this situation. A dissenting member of the
Board argued:
But the fact, which I feel that my colleagues have overlooked, is that employees
are also individuals. As such individuals when re-employed by the respondent, their
obligations fairly assumed cannot be so lightly disregarded. Otherwise the union
security clause would become inoperative as to every employee, otherwise bound,
who resigned or was discharged, even if for only a day, and was subsequently re40
hired.
* Cox, Cases on Labor Law vii (1948).
'8 Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev.
274, 305 (1948).
- 77 N.L.R.B. 392 (1948). The clause provided "All employees who on October 6, 1944
are members of the Unions in good standing in accordance with their respective constitutions and by-laws, and all employees who become members after that date shall, as a
condition of employment, maintain their membership in the Unions in good standing for
the duration of this agreement."
- Ibid., at 395.
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Here is a clear example of the conflicting policies of strict contract construction and "industrial jurisprudence." The Board has not always favored the
former policy, however. In Regal Shoe Co.,41 a union security provision illegal
on its face (which usually renders a contract ineffective as a bar to an election) did bar a representation election where external evidence demonstrated
the total ineffectiveness of the illegal clause. And in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.,42 an employee whose dues were one month in arrears lost his seniority
in accord with a union by-law, but not his job:
True, the Union demanded a lesser discrimination than the union-security clause
entitled it to demand: it actually requested only that Rhodus be dropped to the
bottom of the seniority list. But this leniency on the part of the Union cannot reasonably be said to have detracted from the otherwise meritable position of43either
the Union or Employer; nor should it enhance Rhodus' claim to protection.
This position was abandoned, however, in Krambo Food Stores, Inc., 44 where

a sharply divided Board overruled the Firestone case, holding that the withholding of vacation benefits was "over and above the threat of discharge. ' 45
The usual approach by the Board seems to favor the policy of strict contract construction. This may be a matter of training and background; 46 ref47
erence has often been made to the dominance of legalism in the agency. It
should be understood, however, that the use of "legalism" by writers to characterize the fault they find in the Board's present approach is not really appropriate. A court properly decides disputes by recourse not to "law'--but to
the sound legal principles of the law. If blameworthy decisions are rendered by
courts, it is those courts and not the "law" that should merit criticism. The
Board's approach in its differences with the arbitration award in the Monsanto case can be described as "legalistic" only if the word means a misuse of
legal principles and not the application of legal principles. Of course, any narrowness in approach may also be mixed and perhaps guided by the political
persuasion of the Board member. 4s The Board's approach has also been said
to result from an unawareness by the members that policy decisions are neces"106 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1953).
"93 N.L.R.B. 981 (1951).
3Ibid., at 982.
"106 N.L.R.B. 870 (1953).
"Ibid., at 878.
For the qualifications of the most recently nominated Board member, consult 35 Lab.
Rel. Rep. 355.
' Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 429 (1950): "The refusal of Congress to appropriate
funds for experts in industrial relations handicaps the NLRB in solving the questions of
labor policy for which it is already responsible"; Humphrey, The Government at the Bargaining Table, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 129, 141 (1954) ("technical and legalistic approach").
Board member Rodgers stated in a recent address at Duke University: "Indeed, this
agency has by congressional mandate been confined to the relatively formal, or if you
will, legalistic aspects of labor relations."
'For a reminder of the many recent major policy shifts of the Board, consult Lab.
Rel. Rep., 34 Analysis 69. The Senate Labor Committee chairman had indicated that with
consideration of Board Member Beeson's successor would come a review of recent NLRB
policy changes. 35 Lab. Rel. Rep. 355. This review might have included not only a political review but a review of the problems noted in the text as well. But because of the
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sary in the adjudication of labor disputes. 49 The argument is that the constant
reiteration by the members in their public speeches of the belief that the
Board need not and should not decide policy matters is distressingly unrealistic because the statute to be administered is but a guide, necessarily giving
the Board discretion. Thus, the argument continues, the Board, by ignoring
policy, meets problems case by case without the benefit of perspective (only
rarely, for instance, are briefs amicus curiae solicited).S° Another examination
of the Board's activities sees the Board's approach as the consequence of a
"reference to broader legal doctrines" which tend to "obscure the real questions." 51
But to attribute the policy of strict construction to "legalism" in any sense
of the word is, perhaps, to beg the question. We have noted a more "liberal"
approach by arbitrators:
On the question of explicit criteria for decision, the fact that the arbitrator need
not be a member of any craft connected with the formal legal institution is of peculiar importance. Who would think of arguing to a lay arbitrator in a commercial
case the rules of formal law alone? Obviously he is as much if not more interested,
and explicitly so, in the conflict of interest which exists, the practices which are
normal, the allocation of risks which parties in the business normally make, and any
factor which makes the particular case materially different from the normal. 52
But do we wish the NLRB members and the reviewing judges to be like
arbitrators? 53 Arbitration, of course, has a possible weakness in the precedent
value of its decisions. The question is not soon answered, moreover, since it is
not clear what arbitrators are really like. 54 But if arbitrators are successfully
"mounting workloads" of the Board a successor was approved (as well as a general counsel) at a fifteen-minute session on February 25, 1955. 35 Lab. Rel. Rep. 385.
"Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 93 (1954).
'o"It is submitted that the adoption and extensive use of rule making procedures would
substantially improve the policy developing functions of the Board. It would compel the
Board to face more directly its policy problems, would provide more complete and pointed
discussion, and would encourage the Board to make more articulate the rules and policies
which it follows." Ibid., at 106.
'
Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer Persuasion,"
49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 594, 613 (1954): "The new Board membership has, in its handling of
these employer persuasion cases, been looking less intently than its predecessors at the
original purpose of the particular law involved and more at general principles borrowed
from other fields of the law and from wider areas of human experience. This kind of
change in statutory administration results inevitably in a lessening of the statute's impact" (ibid., at 615). A possible example is the application by the Board of general notions
about voluntary associations to the dispute in the Communication Workers case.
Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 698, 701 (1952). But cf. The Arbitrator's Approach to Labor Contract
Interpretation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1338 (1951).
For an example of how the courts of a particular state feel about arbitration (a feeling narrowing the arbitrator's function in this instance), consult judicial Innovations in
the New York Arbitration Law, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 148 (1953).
" Mentschikoff, op. cit. supra note 52, indicates a research program on this question.
The solutions to other problems are also dependent upon such research--e.g., the defining
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applying "industrial jurisprudence," as seems likely, the Board and courts
could well follow the arbitrators in this respect. And it is suggested that one
way the Board might achieve this result is to give more weight to the conclusions of its trial examiners, who may approximate arbitrators in "industrial
jurisprudence." 55 (The trial examiner's report was rejected in the Communication Workers case.)
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts, however, need not
wait for the complete answer to these problems before acting. This examination of the Communication Workers decision suggests the undesirability of
the present approach (enhanced in the court of appeals by dubious fears of
helping the union at the bargaining table) to the solution of one industrial
relations problem.5 6 The remarks concerning "industrial jurisprudence" could
indicate a more meaningful approach in rapport with the needs of the industrial community.
of the limits to judicial exercise of equitable discretion in the enforcement of arbitration
contracts.
' Trial examiners are selected by members of the Board from Civil Service registers
and serve subject to Civil Service regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act. Field
examiners are also important. Although they do not actually "arbitrate," the field examiners were responsible in 1953 for closing 5100 of 5800 unfair-labor-practice cases without the necessity of formal action. Eighteenth Annual Report, NLRB 99, Table 7 (1953).
The present standard for the scope of judicial review of Board decisions and the weight
to be accorded to trial examiners' reports is set forth in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
'And it bears repeating that if the Board and court had but applied the most "legal"
of analyses-the Hohfeldian analysis-they would not have erred.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PATENT PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
The Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.1

During the past half-century it has often been suggested that our patent law,
founded on this provision of the Constitution, should include a compulsory
licensing provision. 2 Since the expressed constitutional purpose is to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, it has been argued that compulsory
licensing should be employed at least where patents have been suppressed or
'U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8.
'The first bill of significance was the "Oldfield Revision," H.R. 23417, 62d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1912). See Hearings before the Committee on Patents, 62d Cong. 2d Sess. (1913) ;
subsequent hearings on other bills
are listed in Wyss and Brainard, Compulsory Licensing
of Patents, 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 499, 500 (1938).

